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CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER-A FETUS IS NOT A
"PERSON" AS THE TERM IS USED IN THE MANSLAUGHTER STAT-
UTE. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).
Robert Keith Meadows drove his car while intoxicated. He was
accompanied by Vanessa Weicht. Weicht was in her fortieth week of
pregnancy, carrying a fetus two weeks "overdue." Meadows drove
his car recklessly, crossed the center line of the highway, and struck
an oncoming car head-on. Randy Waldrip, driver of the oncoming
car, and Vanessa Weicht's fetus were killed as a result of the accident.
Meadows andWeicht survived their serious injuries.
The state charged Meadows with two counts of manslaughter:
one for the death of Randy Waldrip and the other for the death of
Weicht's full-term fetus. The pertinent part of the manslaughter stat-
ute under which the state charged Meadows provides that one com-
mits manslaughter if one "recklessly causes the death of another
person."' The Benton County Circuit Court convicted Meadows on
both counts, and he appealed the conviction to the Arkansas Supreme
Court.
The central issue on appeal involved whether the term "person"
as used in the manslaughter statute included fetuses. Meadows ar-
gued that the term "person" did not include fetuses2 and, therefore,
the reckless killing of fetuses did not come within the purview of the
manslaughter statute. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed. After
noting that the statute failed to define "person," the court found that
the common law did not include fetuses within the definition of the
term "person." Refusing to create and retroactively apply a new
common law crime of fetus homicide, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed the manslaughter conviction for the death of the full-term,
viable fetus. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).
Medical, ethical, and legal questions regarding the status of
human fetuses have perplexed scholars for centuries.3 The great phi-
losophers of early Greece possessed only scant medical knowledge of
fetal life, viability, and causes of fetal death. Their key writings on the
killing of fetuses concerned abortion, not manslaughter, and they
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1504(1)(c) (1977).
2. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 107, 722 S.W.2d 584, 585 (1987).
3. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973) (detailed discussion of ancient
philosophical and theological attitudes about fetuses).
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based their thinking regarding protections due human fetuses upon
the primary ethical consideration that once a human fetus became
animate, that is, endowed with a soul,4 destruction of the fetus was
wrongful. Although this Greek opinion was rigid, philosophers con-
flicted on the timing of animation. Pythagoras (580-500 B.C.)
thought that a human embryo was animate from conception,5 and he
rejected abortion without qualification.6 Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.)
incorporated this Pythagorean anti-abortion position 7 into his ethical
guide for the medical profession, the Hippocratic Oath.' Plato (428-
348 B.C.) thought that a body was inanimate until it moved,9 but he
commended aborting fetuses if the parents were beyond the lawful
procreation age.10 Plato's student, Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.) sup-
ported abortion "before sense and life have begun""1 as a means of
controlling population growth. 12 St Augustine of Hippo (A.D. 354-
430) acknowledged the distinction between an embryo endowed with
a soul and an inanimate embryo, but believed that humans could not
determine when human fetuses become animate. 3 These theological
and philosophical concepts contributed to early English thought re-
garding the homicide of human fetuses. 14
In the middle of the thirteenth century, the English writer
Bracton focused upon "quickening"-the first movement of the fetus
felt in utero -as the critical moment when a fetus attained the pro-
tecton th Me manslaughter laws. The fetus lived - iit moved, and its
subsequent death marked the death of a human being.' 6 Although
Bracton did not explicitly require a "born alive" fetus for the killing
to amount to a homicide, the relatively primitive state of medical
4. PLATO, Phaedrus, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES 493 (Bollingen Series No. 71, 1961).
5. L. EDELSTEIN, The Hippocratic Oath, in ANCIENT MEDICINE 18-19 (1967).
6. See id. at 19.
7. Id. at 17-18, 20.
8. Id. at 6 (quoting the Hippocratic Oath: "I will not give to a woman an abortive
remedy.").
9. PLATO, supra note 4.
10. PLATO, Republic, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES 700 (Bollingen Series No. 71, 1961).
11. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1302 (R. McKeon ed.
1941).
12. Id.
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133 n.22 (1973).
14. This history is reviewed exhaustively in Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The
Born Alive Rule and other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 563 (1987).
15. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1-45 (13th ed. 1977).
16. "If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to procure an abortion,
if the foetus is already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened, he commits homi-
cide." 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (S. Thorne trans., G.
Woodbine ed. 1968).
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technology would have made difficult the task of proving that a fetus
lived at the time of the trauma to the mother. 7 Near the end of the
thirteenth century, an unknown author prepared a commentary on
Bracton called Fleta.Is Fleta also expressed the theory that killing a
"formed and quickened"' 9 fetus constituted homicide. Fleta did not
require that in utero injuries to the fetus be followed by live birth and
subsequent death for homicide conviction, but it faced the same evi-
dentiary problem that plagued Bracton. Unless the child was born
alive, proving that the quickened fetus was alive at the time of the
trauma to the mother was virtually impossible because of the limited
understanding of fetal development, periods of fetal life, and causes of
fetal death.E°
This evidentiary obstacle led to the development of the "born
alive rule." A modern statement of the rule provides that, absent a
statute providing otherwise, one cannot be convicted of homicide for
the death of a fetus, regardless of the stage of development, because a
fetus is not a person.2" To be the victim of a homicide, a fetus must be
born alive and subsequently die of injuries sustained as a fetus.2 2
Andrew Horn was apparently the first English writer to have ex-
plicitly adopted the "born alive" requirement for homicide of a fe-
tus.2" His treatise, which appeared near the end of the thirteenth
century, distinguishes the killing of fetuses in the uterus and the kill-
ing of children after birth. Under this view, the killing of a fetus is not
murder.24 Lambard, writing in the sixteenth century, also adopted
17. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 580 n.84.
18. SELDEN SOCIETY, FLETA (H. Richardson & G. Sayles trans. 1953).
19. Id. at 60-61.
He, too, in strictness is a homicide who has pressed upon a pregnant woman or has
given her poison or has struck her in order to procure an abortion or to prevent
conception, if the foetus was already formed and quickened, and similarly he who
has given or accepted poison with the intention of preventing procreation or concep-
tion. A woman also commits homicide if, by a potion or the like, she destroys a
quickened child in her womb.
Id.
20. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 580.
21. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 9 (1968).
22. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 67 at 530-31 (1972).
In the United States the "born alive" requirement has come to mean that the fetus be
fully brought forth and establish an "independent circulation" before it can be con-
sidered a human being. Proof of live birth and death by criminal agency are required
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a homicide conviction.
Id. at 531 (footnotes omitted).
23. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 581.
24. As to the infant who is slain we must distinguish whether he is slain en ventre sa
mere [in its mother's womb] or after birth, for in the former case there is no homi-
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the "born alive" requirement because of the difficulty in determining
if the fetus died in utero of natural causes or because of a trauma
inflicted on the pregnant woman by a defendant.25
Sir Edward Coke's writing greatly influenced American law. He
considered quickening and live birth when writing of the killing of a
fetus.2 6 Coke did not write of any criminality for causing the death of
a fetus before quickening," but he opined that defendants committed
great misprisons2 s when they caused the death of a quick fetus.29 De-
fendants committed murder if, by injuring a pregnant woman, they
caused her fetus to die after being born alive, because a living child
existed as a reasonable creature. 30 The writings of Sir William Black-
stone equally influenced American law. In considering the "born
alive" requirement, Blackstone also concluded that when a defendant
killed a fetus, the defendant committed "a great misprison," but not
murder.31 However, if a child born alive later died because of injuries
the defendant inflicted on the pregnant woman, the defendant com-
mitted murder.32 By the 1830s, the "born alive rule" transcended the
cide, for no one can be adjudged an infant until he has been seen in the world so that
it may be known whether he is a monster or no ....
A. HORN, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES 139 (Selden Society 1893).
25. If the mother destroy hir childe newely borne, this is Felonie of the death of a
man, though the child have no name, nor be baptized. And the Justice of Peace may
deale accordingly. But if a childe be destroyed in the mothers belly, is no manslayer
nor Felone to be imprisoned upon this statute.
W. LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA, OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 217-18
(1581 & photo. reprint 1970).
26. If a woman be quick with childe and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her
womb; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is deliv-
ered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and no murder: but if the childe be
borne alive, and dieth of the Potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in the
law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura [in existence] when it is
born alive.
E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *50.
27. Id.
28. "In Coke's time... it was a vague offence .... High misdemeanors." 2 BOUVIER'S
LAW DICTIONARY 2225-26 (Rawle's 3d rev. 1914).
29. E. COKE, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. To kill a child in it's mother's womb, is now no murder, but a great misprison:
but if the child be born alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received
in the womb, it seems, by the better opinion, to be murder in such as administered or
gave them.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 198. Blackstone further
wrote that there must be "some sort of presumptive evidence that the child was born alive"
before a mother could be convicted of murdering her bastard child, despite a statute declaring
that concealment of the corpse was conclusive evidence of murder. Id.
32. Id.
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realm of legal treatise material; British courts applied the rule, and it
became ensconced in English common law.33
Early American courts applied the "born alive rule."34  Even
though the original evidentiary reasons for applying the common law
"born alive rule" have been removed by medical technological ad-
vances, including fetal heart monitoring, ultrasound examinations,
and fetal autopsies, the rule continues to dominate American law re-
garding the homicide of fetuses, regardless of their gestational devel-
opment. 35  During the 1980s, many state courts applied the rule to
prohibit homicide convictions for the deaths of viable fetuses in the
face of occasionally gruesome facts and despite the high degree of cul-
pability of some defendants. 36 However, Kansas, South Carolina, and
Massachusetts have judicially rejected the "born alive rule" without
33. Rex v. Sellis, 7 Carr. & P. 850, 173 Eng. Rep. 370 (1837) (A newborn child was
decapitated and dumped in a privy. The first question the court faced was whether the entire
child was born alive.); Rex v. Crutchley, 7 Carr. & P. 814, 173 Eng. Rep. 355 (1836) (A
mother strangled her child after only its head protruded during birth. There could be no
murder conviction because the child was not wholly born and alive.); Rex v. Brain, 6 Carr. &
P. 349, 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1834) (Child must be wholly born and be alive to be a homicide
subject.); Rex v. Enoch, 5 Carr. & P. 539, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (1833) (Newborn child was
stabbed in the head with a fork, but the child must have had independent circulation to be
considered born alive. The court made references to writings of Coke, Bracton, and Fleta.);
Rex v. Poulton, 5 Carr. & P. 329, 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (1832) (The material question for the jury
was whether the child was born alive. If the child was not born alive, the prisoner could not be
convicted of murder.).
34. Illustrative of these early American cases are Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671
(1898); State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161 N.W. 1022 (1917); and Harris v. State, 28 Tex. App.
308, 12 S.W. 1102 (1889). Other cases and materials describing the application of the born
alive rule in many jurisdictions are collected at Meadows, 291 Ark. at 108, 722 S.W.2d at 585
(1987). See generally, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 40 A.L.R. 3D
444 (1971).
35. Forsythe, supra note 14, at 595-96.
36. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that although the beating death of a woman eight
and one-half months pregnant was murder of the mother, the deceased viable fetus was not
murdered. The Court required not only that the injuries inflicted upon the mother be the
cause of the death of the fetus, but that the baby be born alive and later succumb to those
injuries. This was a case of first impression in Illinois. People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402
N.E.2d 203 (1980). In Kentucky, a defendant forced his hand up the vagina of his estranged
pregnant wife and manually aborted her 30-week old, viable fetus. He could not be convicted
of murder because the statute penalized intentionally causing "the death of another person."
The Kentucky Supreme Court, applying a substantive "born alive rule," determined that a
fetus was not a person. Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983). In New Jersey,
reckless driving caused the death of a fetus three days before its expected full-term delivery.
The reckless driver was not convicted of death by auto because the fetus was not born alive.
This was also a case of first impression. State ex rel A.W.S., 182 N.J. Super. 334, 440 A.2d
1174 (1980). In New Mexico, reckless drunk driving resulted in the death of a viable fetus.
The appellate court dismissed vehicular homicide prosecution because the unborn fetus was
not a human being within the meaning of the statute. State v. Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d
1222 (Ct. App. 1982).
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waiting for their state legislatures to act.37
Several states have enacted feticide statutes, abandoning to some
degree the "born alive rule."3 " California includes fetuses directly
within the homicide statute39 as a result of Keeler v. Superior Court of
Amador County,' a decision of the California Supreme Court. In
Keeler, an estranged husband blocked a mountain road with his car
and didn't allow his former wife to pass. Seeing that she was preg-
nant, he said "I'm going to stomp it out of you."4 He beat the wo-
man unconscious, and she later delivered a stillborn fetus of up to
thirty-six weeks gestation. Doctors concluded, with reasonable medi-
cal certainty, that the fetus was viable and would have had a seventy-
five to ninety-six percent chance of surviving had it been born just
before the injuries to the mother. The California Supreme Court
ruled that to include fetuses as subjects of murder would be rewriting
the murder statute42 in the guise of construing it. The court further
held that extending criminal liability is the responsibility of the legis-
lature, and that the court could not create a new common law crime
of murder of a fetus and apply it to the case on appeal without violat-
ing the due process rights of the defendant. 3
The California legislature reacted to Keeler by passing a statute
making it murder to unlawfully kill a fetus with malice afore-
thought. .4 California courts have interpreted the statute as applying
37. State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984) (An estranged husband stabbed
his former wife, who was pregnant with a full-term, viable fetus. The South Carolina Supreme
Court prospectively applied the state homicide statute to fetuses that could be proved viable at
the time of the injury to the mother. The court declared it had a right and duty to develop
common law to better serve a changing society, and that it would be grossly inconsistent to
classify a fetus as a human being for the purpose of imposing civil liability, but as nonhuman
for imposition of criminal liability.); State v. Burrell, 237 Kan. 303, 699 P.2d 499 (1985)
(When a woman eight months pregnant was thrown from a car and killed, the Kansas
Supreme Court applied the homicide statute to the viable fetus without discussion.); Common-
wealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (A fetus killed in a car accident was
later delivered stillborn. Physicians conducted an autopsy on the fetus and determined that
the fetus was viable at the time of the injury to the mother and that the trauma to the mother
was the cause of fetal mortality. With no evidentiary reason to apply the "born alive rule," the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected it.).
38. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1105 (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1968).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1987).
40. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
41. Id. at 623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (1970).
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, with malice aforethought.")
43. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633-34, 470 P.2d 617, 625-26, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 489-90 (1970).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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only to the murder 5 of viable46 fetuses.
To date, the highest courts of twenty-four states have held, under
facts similar to those in Meadows, that they would not create a new
common law crime of fetus homicide. South Carolina, Kansas, and
Massachusetts are exceptions; the high courts of those states created
the new common law crime.48
For many years, an Arkansas feticide statute49 protected the in-
terest of fetal life. This statute made quickened fetuses subjects of
manslaughter if the injury to the mother would be murder should her
death result.50 The state employed the statute in 1965 to convict a
defendant of manslaughter. The defendant had intentionally driven
his car so that it struck a pregnant woman, killing her seven and one-
half month old fetus.5 ' The feticide statute also appears to have been
used in 1977 to convict a defendant of manslaughter.52 The defendant
had intentionally drowned a pregnant woman. 53
The Arkansas General Assembly expressly repealed the feticide
statute when it enacted the Criminal Code.54 Since the enactment of
45. People v. Carlson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 349, 358, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (1974) ("[T]here
is no crime constituting manslaughter of a fetus.").
46. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976) (construing the word
"fetus" to refer to a viable unborn child).
47. 291 Ark. at 109-10, 722 S.W.2d at 585. See, e.g., Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So.
671 (1898); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970);
State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); White v. State, 238 Ga. 224, 232
S.E.2d 57 (1977); People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); Hollis v. Common-
wealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975); Smith v. State, 33
Me. 48 (1851); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980); State v. Soto,
378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985); State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59 (1980); State ex
rel A.W.S., 182 N.J. Super. 278, 440 A.2d 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); State v.
Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d 1222 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90
N.E.2d 23 (1949); State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161 N.W. 1022 (1917); State v. Dickinson, 28
Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971); State v. McKee, I Add. 1 (Pa. 1791); State v. Amaro,
448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923); Harris v.
State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 12 S.W. 1102 (1889); State v. Larson, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978);
Lane v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 509, 248 S.E.2d 781 (1978); Huebner v. State, 131 Wis. 162,
111 N.W. 63 (1907); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963).
48. See cases cited supra, note 37.
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964) (repealed 1975).
50. "The willful killing of an unborn, quick child, by any injury to the mother of such
child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be adjudged
manslaughter." Tiner v. State, 239 Ark. 819, 826, 394 S.W.2d 608, 612 (1965).
51. Id. at 819, 394 S.W.2d 608.
52. Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977) (The crime was committed
on July 27, 1975, and the Arkansas feticide statute remained effective until January 1, 1976.).
53. Id. at 590, 550 S.W.2d at 434.
54. Act of April 8, 1975, No. 928, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 2463, 2466 (repealing ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-2223 (1964)).
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the Code, no reported Arkansas cases have applied the manslaughter
statute to the death of a fetus.55
It was against this historic background of the "born alive rule"
that the Arkansas Supreme Court considered Meadows v. State.5 6
The court faced two issues: whether the term "person," undefined in
the manslaughter statute, could be construed to include a full-term,
viable fetus; and, if not, whether the court could properly create a new
common law crime applicable to the killing of such a fetus.57
As to the first issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined
that the common law effective when the manslaughter statute was
passed (originally in 1839,5" later as part of the 1975 Criminal Code59)
governed the construction of the meaning of "person."'  In ascertain-
ing the common law, the Arkansas Supreme Court looked to early
English cases, as well as cases from Arkansas6 and other states. The
court also considered the early writings on common law.62 Fetuses
were not included within the common law definition of "person" in
1839 and 197563 and, therefore, the killing of an unborn viable fetus
was not murder.' In its argument, the state acknowledged that a
fetus was not a person at common law,65 and accepted the substantive
explanation of the "born alive rule."'6 6 Nevertheless, the state urged
the Arkansas Supreme Court to alter the common law by creating a
new criminal law offense for manslaughter of a viable fetus.67
The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to create a new common
law crime by judicial fiat. 61 It deferred to the Arkansas General As-
sembly, 69 recognizing the duty of the legislature to determine the type
of conduct which constitutes a crime and the applicable punish-
55. See also Forsythe, supra note 14, at 596 n. 161, indicating that Arkansas "adopted" the
"born alive rule" with the Meadows decision.
56. 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).
57. Id. at 107-08, 722 S.W.2d at 585.
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2201, -2209 (1964) (repealed 1975).
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1504 (1977).
60. 291 Ark. at 107, 722 S.W.2d at 585 (citing State v. Pierson, 44 Ark. 265 (1884)).
61. 291 Ark. at 107, 722 S.W.2d at 585 (but the Arkansas Supreme Court cited no Arkan-
sas cases in ascertaining the common law).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 107-08, 722 S.W.2d at 585.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Since the "born alive rule" was created to serve an evidentiary purpose, not one of
substantive law, other prosecutors might argue that a court may abandon the "born alive rule"
without creating a new common law crime.
67. 291 Ark. at 108, 722 S.W.2d at 585.
68. Id. at 109, 722 S.W.2d at 586.
69. Id.
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ment.7° Judges created common law crimes during medieval times
because legislatures sat infrequently7 and legislation was scanty.72
These original reasons for creating common law crimes have disap-
peared.73 The court further reasoned that members of the General
Assembly are more frequently elected, more closely attuned to the
public, and better suited to represent the people of the State than are
members of the Arkansas Supreme Court.74 Finally, General Assem-
bly committees would be able to conduct hearings in a nonadversarial
manner and would be able to distinguish degrees of culpability and to
graduate penalties. 75 The court, however, would be limited to making
rulings solely on the adversarily developed facts before it.76
The Arkansas Supreme Court considered and declined to follow
the Massachusetts and South Carolina decisions that judicially abro-
gated the "born alive rule."' 77 The Arkansas Supreme Court noted
that the Massachusetts courts, in abrogating the "born alive rule,"
relied on and extended an earlier holding in a civil case that held that
a viable fetus was a "person" within the state's wrongful death stat-
ute. 78 The Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that Arkansas has no
such holding in a civil case, and that the holding of a comparable
Arkansas case, Carpenter v. Logan,79 was just the opposite.80 An even
more compelling reason why the court could not infer legislative in-
tent for the term "person" to include viable fetuses was that the legis-
lature had expressly repealed" a manslaughter statute specifically
relating to fetuses.8 2 Even if the "born alive rule" were judicially ab-
rogated, the court noted that the Meadows conviction could not be
upheld. A new common law rule applying the manslaughter statute
to full-term, viable fetuses would have to be applied prospectively to
70. Id. (citing Sparrow v. State, 284 Ark. 396, 397, 683 S.W.2d 218, 219 (1985)).
71. 291 Ark. at 108-09, 722 S.W.2d at 585-86 (citing W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 57-
69).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 109, 722 S.W.2d at 586.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 110, 722 S.W.2d at 586 (Hays, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 110, 722 S.W.2d at 586-87 (citing Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass.
354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975)).
79. 281 Ark. 184, 662 S.W.2d 808 (1984) (the court reasoned that a fetus born dead is not
a "deceased person" under the Probate Code).
80. 291 Ark. at 110, 722 S.W.2d at 587.
81. Act of April 8, 1975, No. 928, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 2463, 2466 (repealing ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-2223 (1964)).
82. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964) (repealed 1975).
1987-88]
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provide due process.13
Associate Justice Hays filed a lone dissenting opinion. He argued
that affirming the trial court would not be creating new law, but sim-
ply giving effect to the legislative intent for the 1975 manslaughter
statute.84 Justice Hays opined that the "born alive rule" was discred-
ited and should be rejected, as it was in Massachusetts and South Car-
olina. 5 Justice Hays stated that the evidentiary rule had no function
in Meadows, as the viability and cause of death of the fetus were fully
supported by the proof produced at trial.86 Justice Hays also argued
that the facts of Meadows warranted no extended discussion of due
process problems,8" and that Meadows had adequate "fair warning"
that his conduct was unlawful. 8 Meadows knew that his drunken
driving was unlawful, even if he failed to foresee the final
circumstances.
As a result of Meadows, the "born alive rule" was adopted as
Arkansas law. By its holding, a full-term, viable fetus cannot be the
subject of homicide because it is not within the purview of the homi-
cide statute. Meadows proscribes homicide convictions regardless of
the culpability of the defendant, and as a result, Arkansas courts can-
not successfully convict defendants of homicide when they intention-
ally destroy full-term fetuses.
One of the Directors of Arkansas Right To Life, an organization
"devoted to the legal protection of innocent human life,"8 9 filed an
amicus curiae brief90 with the Arkansas Supreme Court. Arkansas
Right to Life reacted immediately to Meadows by seeking legislation
making viable fetuses "persons" within the purview of the manslaugh-
ter statute. 9' A state legislator was prepared to sponsor the legisla-
tion. 92 Planned Parenthood of Greater Arkansas, a family planning
organization, submitted an alternate proposal to the Attorney Gen-
83. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (retroactive application of a new law
would lead to ex post facto convictions).
84. 291 Ark. at 113, 722 S.w.2d at 588 (Hays, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 115, 722 S.w.2d at 589.
86. Id. at 114, 722 S.W.2d at 589.
87. Id. at 115, 722 S.W.2d at 589.
88. Id. (the defendant's behavior in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) could
reasonably have been thought lawful).
89. Letter from Arkansas Right to Life President Leon Holmes to John Shannon (August
5, 1987) (discussing the Arkansas Right to Life reaction to Meadows).
90. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Ad Hoc Committee of Arkansas Physicians in Support of
Appellee, State of Arkansas, Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987) (No. 86-
166).
91. Letter, supra note 89.
92. Id. (identifying Representative Frank Willems).
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eral.93 This alternate proposal was based on a New Mexico statute94
which "allowed women legal and financial remedy for accidents
caused by negligence which caused them to miscarry." 95 The Attor-
ney General proposed similar legislation, 96 which was enacted by the
General Assembly as an amendment to the battery statute.97 Now,
the battery statute includes pregnant women in the class against
whom intentionally or recklessly causing physical injury is battery in
the first degree.98 This recent amendment would not have changed
the outcome of the Meadows fetus homicide conviction, as a fetus still
can not be the subject of a homicide.
The evidentiary obstacles that led to the creation of the "born
alive rule" have been alleviated by advances in medical technology.
Today, the "born alive rule" is anachronistic, intellectually dishonest,
and unnecessary. It should be abandoned as the rationale for Arkan-
sas' fetus homicide policy. The General Assembly should amend the
manslaughter statute to make criminal the intentional murder or
reckless killing of viable fetuses if the current policy is justified solely
by the "born alive rule." Viability should be defined as it is in the
abortion statute, 99 and the definition should be adjusted as necessary
to remain consistent with that statute and any United States Supreme
Court cases that modify the fetus viability standard.
If the Arkansas General Assembly decides to enact legislation to
make fetuses "persons" within the purview of the manslaughter stat-
ute, the following issues must be considered. Should the homicide
statute include all fetuses, regardless of gestation age, or only viable
fetuses? Anomalous results may occur if all fetuses are included. For
example, a pregnant woman with a pre-viable fetus may walk into an
abortion clinic and have the pregnancy terminated without violating
Arkansas' abortion statute.1°° But if the car of a drunk driver strikes
that same woman and kills her fetus, then that drunk driver will be
subject to homicide prosecution. Distinguishing the facts on the
grounds that the second instance was a nonconsensual termination of
93. Letter from Planned Parenthood of Greater Little Rock Director Chris Charbonneau
to John Shannon (August 21, 1987) (discussing the Planned Parenthood of Greater Arkansas
reaction to Meadows).
94. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (1987).
95. Letter, supra note 93.
96. Id.
97. Act of March 31, 1987, No. 482, 1987 Ark. Acts 1365 (Adv. Leg. Serv.) amending
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1601 (1977).
98. Id.
99. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2562 (1977).
100. Id.
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pregnancy is a weak argument if the statute is designed to give the
fetus "person" status under the manslaughter statute rather than to
protect the rights of the mother. The recent revision to the battery
statute offers that increased protection to the mother.
If only viable fetuses will be included, how will "viable" be de-
fined? The ability of the fetus to exist independent of its mother func-
tions as a standard guide for fetus viability. In applying this test,
viability is a question of fact determined on a case by case basis. An
application of this guide will also lead to anomalous results. For ex-
ample, a pregnant woman may abort her twenty-four week old fetus,
although found viable under these guidelines, without violating the
Arkansas abortion statute,10 while a nonconsensual termination of
the same pregnancy can lead to a homicide conviction.
What degree of culpability should be required to support a homi-
cide conviction? The California statute makes criminal only inten-
tional murder with malice aforethought. An application of that
standard alone would not have changed the outcome of Meadows.
Criminal homicide penalties for merely negligent acts would appear
unduly harsh and bad public policy. If a pregnant woman slips and
falls in a store, killing her fetus, should the shopkeeper face homicide
charges? Should a physician be convicted of manslaughter if a fetus
dies because the doctor misdiagnosed the mother's illness?
Sound public policy reasons may exist for excluding viable fe-
tuses from the purview of the homicide statute. If so, the Arkansas
General Assembly should enunciate the current public policy reason-
ing and abandon--carefully-the "born alive rule."
John T. Shannon
101. Id. (Although the fetus would be viable as defined on the case-by-case basis, it would
not be third trimester viable under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
[Vol. 10:403
